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1.  Introduction 
A feature of low productivity agricultural economies is the dominance of subsistence 
production especially among small growers.  Even though commercialization can yield 
substantial gains, the transition from subsistence farming to market driven production is 
fraught with perils (von Braun and Kennedy, 1994).  First, market volatility is an 
enduring feature of commodity and livestock markets.  This makes cultivation of cash 
crops and livestock risky.  Second, as incomes grow, consumer taste shifts in favor of 
processed foods.  Small farmers are too remote from consumers to track their 
preferences.  Third, small farmers typically lack capital and technical expertise to 
undertake cash crop and livestock production, which are usually more input intensive 
than subsistence crops.  These problems are serious enough that they could effectively 
choke off participation in markets by all except the large farmers.   
  In principle, contract farming could be an institutional arrangement that enables 
farmers to access markets.  While contractual arrangements can vary by crop and by 
country, contracting is a form of joint production where the grower supplies tools, land, 
labor and management while the processor supplies technical assistance, some inputs 
such as seeds or pesticides and undertakes to buy the grower’s output at a pre-determined 
price.   From the point of view of the processor, this arrangement ensures raw material 
supplies of the desired quality (subject, of course, to production uncertainty).  From the 
point of view of the grower, such an arrangement provides an assured market and hence 
reliable income (to the extent permitted by production risks).  Without a contract, risks 
would be too much and few small growers would want to produce these crops.  For this 
  1 reason, Glover (1987) described contract farming as an institutional arrangement that 
combined the advantages of plantations (quality control, coordination of production and 
marketing) and of smallholder production (superior incentives, equity considerations).  
  These theoretical benefits, notwithstanding, contract farming has been 
controversial and has been criticized for being exploitative (Little and Watts, 1994).  
Between the giant corporation and the small farmer, bargaining power surely lies with the 
former.  Also, in practice, growers have encountered problems with respect to 
manipulation of quality standards, poor technical assistance, and sometimes plain 
cheating and deliberate default (Glover, 1987).  As a result, Glover (1987) concluded that 
research must “systematically examine successes and failures and from then draw 
generalizations about the conditions under which CF (contract farming) can operate 
profitably and to the benefit of small farmers” (p 447).  
  Taking this imperative seriously, this paper is an empirical analysis of the gains 
from contract farming, to both farmers and processors, in the case of poultry production 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh in India.  The literature on contract farming is largely 
anecdotal possibly because of lack of data.  Knoeber and Thurman (1995) and Warning 
and Key (2002) are two exceptions.  Knoeber and Thurman analyzed the redistribution of 
risk because of contracting in hog production in U.S.A.  Warning and Key estimated the 
change in producer incomes from contracting by peanut producers in Senegal.   Here we 
draw upon a survey of contract and noncontract poultry producers to analyze both of 
these issues.  Neither of these papers, however, consider the gains to the processors from 
contracting.   
 
  2 2.  The Poultry Industry in Andhra Pradesh 
The poultry industry has seen rapid growth in India. Between 1980/81 and 
1998/99, poultry meat production increased about 3 times from 250,000 tons to about 
770,000 tons.
 1  Correspondingly, its share of total meat output rose from 20% to 27%.  
During the same period, egg production increased from 10,000 to 29,000 million. Andhra 
Pradesh is the leading poultry meat producing state within India.   It accounts for over 
one-fifth of poultry meat as well as egg production in the country.  The growth of poultry 
industry in Andhra Pradesh has been even more remarkable than the national growth 
rates.  For the period 1980/81 to 1998/99, poultry meat production increased by 4.5 times 
while egg production rose by 3.5 times.  About 30% of its broiler output and 15% of egg 
output are exported to other states within India.   
The impressive growth in the poultry meat industry is the result of technological 
breakthroughs in breeding, feeding and health, and sizeable investments from the private 
sector.  The expansion in supply has been spurred by rising incomes and has resulted in 
lower poultry prices in south India where much of the growth has occurred (USDA, 
2004).  The poultry sector is, however, highly prone to production and market risks, 
which periodically affect the profitability of broiler production particularly on the small 
farms. These risks also threaten the profitability of the industry engaged in breeding of 
chicks and manufacturing of feed, vaccines and medicines.  In order to minimize the risks 
to the producers and sustain the profitability of the industry, some large poultry firms (for 
example, Venkateshawara Hatcheries Ltd., Suguna Hatcheries, Pioneer Hatcheries, 
Diamond Hatcheries, etc.) began integrating their activities with that of broiler 
                                                            
1 The USDA estimates poultry production in 2002 to be of the order of 1.4 million tons, which is higher 
than the official estimates (USDA, 2004). 
  3 production through the institution of contract farming as early as in late 1980s.  A large-
scale integrated operation would typically include the raising of grandparent and parent 
flocks, rearing of day-old-chicks, feed milling, provision of veterinary services and 
contract production.  Such integrators are most common in southern and western regions 
of the country (USDA, 2004).   
 
3.  Contracting in Poultry Production 
In a poultry contract, hatcheries provide day-old chicks, feed and medicines to contract 
growers.  The contract growers supply land, labor and other variable inputs (like 
electricity).  At the end of the production cycle, the farmer receives a net price (by 
weight) that is pegged to an industry price set by a group of hatcheries (not the retail 
price).  The industry price fluctuates within a narrow range and is a lot more stable than 
the retail price.  Thus, the farmer receives considerable price insurance.  For sharp 
upward deviations of the retail price from the industry price, farmers receive an incentive.  
This practice presumably lessens the incentives to default on the part of growers and 
reflects the competition from the non-contract sector.   
  The farmer is insured for mortality rates upto 5%.  Beyond that the farmer bears 
the risk of loss.  This controls moral hazard and provides incentives for farmers to supply 
their best effort.  A company representative who sorts out problems especially regarding 
disease visits the farmer daily.  According to company accounts, the processor spends 
time and resources in screening producers for reputation and prior experience.   
The broiler contract is an instance of a “production management” contract where 
the processor supplies inputs and extension, advances credit (in kind), provides price 
  4 insurance and monitors grower effort through frequent inspections.
2  The detailed 
monitoring is because of the considerable credit advanced by the processor that provides 
more than 90% of the cost of production in terms of the value of inputs.  Because the 
frequent monitoring controls for moral hazard, it is also conducive to insurance.   The 
frequency of contact also would mean that the processor incurs considerable transactions 
costs.   
 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data was collected from a primary field survey of contract and non-contract 
producers. The survey was undertaken in the year 2002-03 to collect the required 
information for the year 2001-02. The sample producers were interviewed to collect the 
required data, using pre-tested questionnaires, specifically prepared for each case study. 
Survey data was based on recall memory of the households but it was also supplemented 
with the records maintained by both contract and non-contract producers.  Detailed 
information was collected about the socio-economic characteristics of the sample 
farmers, production-portfolio, item-wise and cycle-wise cost of broiler production, yield 
levels, labor use, and cost of marketing and acquiring information for various activities.  
A sample of 25 contract producers and an equal number of non-contract producers were 
randomly selected from 10 villages of Rangareddy, Mehboobnagar and Nalagonda 
districts in Andhra Pradesh.  A majority of the contract farmers were associated with a 
leading poultry integrator. 
                                                            
2 The terminology is taken from Minot (1986) who classified contracts according to the intensity of contact 
between the processor and the farmer.  The production management contract involves the most contact. 
  5 The survey instrument consisted of four parts.  In the first part, information about 
village level infrastructure was collected.  This consisted of distance from various 
infrastructure facilities such as roads, railways, telephone, post office, regional rural 
bank, animal feed shop among others.  Table 1 compares the availability of infrastructure 
across contract and noncontract farmers.  The big difference between (the sample of) 
contract and noncontract farmers is the better access of noncontract farmers to credit 
facilities whether it is cooperative credit society or the regional rural bank or the primary 
dairy cooperative society.   
The second part of the survey elicited information about the farmer including age, 
schooling, experience in broiler farming and previous occupation.  Table 2 summarizes 
the differences between contract and noncontract farmers in terms of individual 
characteristics.  Notice that the sample of noncontract farmers are twice as experienced, 
slightly more educated and yet a little younger than contract farmers.  The sample of 
noncontract farmers also contains a substantially higher proportion of farmers who are 
specialized in poultry farming.  The noncontract farmers are also those who have 
migrated from agriculture related occupations compared to contract farmers where the 
proportion of farmers with non-agriculture related occupations is large.  Examples of 
such previous occupations include in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electrical 
hardware, cement, police, clothes and wine retailing.   
The third part of the survey collected information about the inputs, outputs and 
revenues from the last 6 production cycles of each grower.  Table 3 presents information 
about the levels of input use per production cycle for contract and noncontract farmers.  
Note that the numbers are averaged twice – first over production cycles for each grower 
  6 and then across all growers within the class of contract and noncontract farmers.  The 
production process in poultry consists of transforming baby chicks into fully-grown birds.  
Besides chicks, the inputs into this process are feed, medicine, labor and time.  
Production is not instantaneous.  For this reason, productivity measures have to be 
normalized with respect to time as well.  With respect to capital assets, contract farmers 
have more equipment as measured by brooders, feeders and water facilities but operate in 
a smaller area.     
From table 3, it can be seen that noncontract farmers have longer production 
cycles, lower flock sizes and correspondingly spend less on medicine, feed, vaccination, 
veterinarian fees and labor cost.  Noncontract farmers depend much more on family labor 
than contract farmers.  Medicines and feed is the single largest item of variable cost.    
Interestingly, even though noncontract growers manage lower flock sizes, they use 
almost as much quantity of feed as the contract growers.   
Table 4 compares the outputs and revenues (from bird sales) of contract and 
noncontract producers across all production cycles.  As contract producers have larger 
flock sizes, their output is also larger whether measured by the number of birds or the 
total weight of birds sold.  However, the average weight of a bird is pretty much the same 
across contract and noncontract growers.  The average revenues per kg of bird are much 
lower for contract farmers reflecting the netting out of input costs by the processor.
3  
The final section of the survey is relevant only to contract farmers and it obtained 
information about the contract between the producer and the processor.  In particular, this 
                                                            
3 In the table, the average revenue per kg of bird is slightly different from the ratio of average revenues and 
average weight of the flock.  This is because the former is the average of the ratio of revenue per kg of bird 
across production cycles and producers while the latter is  the ratio of averages of total revenue and total 
flock weight.   
  7 section contains information about the nature of input sharing between the producer and 
the processor.  As noted in the earlier section, processors supply chicks, medicine, feed 
and veterinary services.  Growers supply land, buildings, labor, and other variable inputs 
such as electricity and disinfectants.  Using the information on input sharing, Table 5 
computes the total value of variable inputs and the value of inputs supplied by the 
grower.  For the farmers not on contract, the two figures are the same.  But this is not so 
for contract growers.  For them, the processor supplies most of the inputs measured in 
value terms.  On average, the out of pocket expenses for inputs for contract farmers is 
less than 3% of total input costs.   
 
5.   Is Contract Production more Efficient? 
  In this section, we consider the production efficiency of contract farming relative 
to noncontract production.  We evaluate production efficiency from the point of view of 
the processor.  As a processor has the choice of contracting with growers or procuring the 
bird from noncontracted growers, contract production should reduce processor’s costs if 
it is to be observed.  The efficiency of contract production is therefore evaluated relative 
to the production costs of independent growers.   
Costs in contract production could be lower than in noncontract production in two 
distinct ways.  First, because of technology and management practices brought by the 
processor, contract production could be more efficient than noncontract production.  
Second, if the processor can access some inputs such as insurance and credit at lower cost 
than growers, then contract production could be cheaper than noncontract production 
even if production efficiency is unchanged.  While our data set lacks evidence on credit 
  8 costs, it is not clear that even if information on differential credit costs were available, 
whether it would be appropriate to count such savings as due to contract production.  
Interest arbitrage possibilities exist even in the absence of contract production and such 
gains are realized by the creditors of noncontract growers.  Therefore, from an economy 
wide point of view, it is the cost reduction from better technology and production 
practices that should be counted as efficiency gain. 
Table 6 displays the major components of production costs in both modes of 
production.
4  It can be seen that the cost structure is comparable across the two 
production systems.  Feed, medicine and veterinary services accounts for about 75% of 
total variable cost.  The expenditure on chicks is about 20-22% of cost while other 
variable costs such as labor and electricity constitute only 3% of total costs.   
As the cost of poultry production is primarily the cost of chicks and feed, the 
technology is characterized by constant costs.  Table 7 displays the results of regressing 
the total variable cost on total output (measured in kgs).  Recall the data set consists of 
observations from upto 6 production cycles for 25 contract and 25 noncontract growers.  
Thus, the error term will contain a producer-specific component.  To take that into 
account, all standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity as well as dependence 
stemming from the correlation of errors from the production cycle of a particular 
producer.
 5  The regression is done separately for contract and noncontract producers. The 
predicted value from these regressions is graphed against the dependent variable in 
Figures 1 and 2.   
                                                            
4 Note we are considering only variable inputs. 
5 These are simply the Huber-White standard errors corrected for correlation within clusters (Rogers, 1993, 
Wooldridge, 2002).  Here a cluster consists of observations from different production cycles for a particular 
producer.   
  9 From the results, it can be seen that it costs Rs. 30 to produce a kg of bird under 
contract production and Rs. 26.22 under noncontract production.  This suggests that 
processors would be better off by abandoning contract production and should instead buy 
from noncontract growers.  However, because contracting is a form of joint production, it 
should be remembered that it is the processors who determine the feed, medicine and 
chick costs of contract growers.  Therefore, these numbers are not necessarily indicative 
of competitive prices but may well be a sign of transfer pricing.   
To have cost figures that reflect competitive prices for feed and medicine, we 
recalculate contract production costs using the price paid by noncontract growers.  This 
price is recovered from cost data of noncontract growers.  Their unit feed costs depends 
on feed prices as well as the feed-conversion ratio.  The feed price paid by noncontract 
growers can therefore be obtained as the ratio of their feed cost and their feed-conversion 
ratio.   
The above procedure assumes unit costs for feed and medicine are constant.  This 
is indeed the case as the feed and medicine costs are proportional to output.  This has to 
be so because feed and medicine account for more than 75% of costs and as we saw 
earlier, total variable cost is linear in output.  For noncontract growers, feed and medicine 
costs  work out to Rs. 19 per kg of bird, which is calculated as the slope coefficient in a 
linear regression of feed and medicine costs on output.  In the second step, we regress 
feed quantity on output and obtain the feed-conversion ratios as 1.88 and 2.15 for 
contract and noncontract growers.
6  In other words, noncontract growers use 2.15 kgs of 
feed to produce a kg of bird.  Thus, the price of a kg of feed and medicine works out to be  
  10 (19/2.15) = Rs. 8.84 where we are assuming medicine requirements (medicine, vaccines 
and veterinary services) is proportional to feed.
7   
In the third step, we use this price and the feed quantity used by contract growers 
to recalculate their feed and medicine costs that would obtain if they were charged the 
same prices for feed and medicine as noncontract growers.  To these costs, we add the 
observed costs for chicks and other inputs that are incurred by contract growers and we 
thus obtain a simulated figure for total costs for each production cycle of the contract 
grower.
8  Finally, by regressing the simulated costs on output, we obtain the marginal 
(and average) costs for the contract grower as Rs. 24.3.   Compared to the marginal costs 
for the noncontract grower of Rs. 26.2 per kg, contract production involves a saving 
(relative to procurement from noncontract growers) of Rs 1.9 for every kg of bird.   
This exercise does not take into account the fact that contract growers have 
shorter production cycles than noncontract growers.  As contract production is more 
efficient than noncontract production at zero rate of interest, taking interest costs into 
account can only increase its relative advantage.  Rs. 1.9 is a minimum bound on the 
surplus from contracting relative to contract production.  For instance, assuming an 
annual interest rate of 15% per annum for both modes of production, the marginal costs 
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6 The  in the regressions were 0.98 and 0.89 respectively for noncontract and contract growers.  The 
intercept  terms were positive but small.  As a result, the average feed-conversion ratios are slightly larger 
than the marginal feed conversion ratios and this difference declines as output increases.   
7 Even if this assumption is invalid, it will not lead to large errors as medicine costs are small relative to 
feed costs.  For noncontract growers, medicine costs are less than 0.5% of feed costs.  A similar figure is 
not available for contract growers as the processors do not charge separately for feed and medicine.  
However, it is unlikely to be drastically different.   
8 In a linear regression of chick costs on chick numbers, the  was 0.94 and 0.99 respectively for 
noncontract and contract growers, the slope coefficients were 12.03 for both groups.  Thus the cost of an 
additional chick does not vary between the two production modes.  This does not, of course, mean that the 
cost of day old chicks for contract growers is free from transfer pricing.  A survey of the poultry industry in 
2001 notes that integrated operations with breeding operations are able to produce day old chicks at a cost 
2 R
  11 of noncontract production rises to Rs. 26.77 while that of contract production rises to Rs. 
24.7.  The savings from contract production therefore rises to Rs. 2.07 per kg of bird per 
production cycle.   
It might be argued that the borrowing cost of funds for growers would be higher 
than for processors that have access to institutional finance.  For instance, if noncontract 
growers can borrow only at 21% when processors can borrow at 15%, the cost of 
noncontract production goes up to Rs. 26.95 while that of contract production does not 
change.  It would seem then that the surplus from contract production rises to Rs. 2.28 
per kg.  However, note that Rs. 0.21 (the difference between Rs. 2.23 and Rs. 2.07) of 
this surplus is because of interest arbitrage by the processor and not because of greater 
production efficiency in contracting.  As discussed earlier, in so far as such interest 
arbitrage possibilities exist even in the absence of contracting, it does not seem legitimate 
from an economy wide point of view to count the savings from interest arbitrage as part 
of the overall surplus from contracting relative to noncontracting.   
The higher efficiency of contract production is driven by its lower feed-
conversion ratio.  To test this statistically, we pooled the samples of contract and 
noncontract producers and regressed feed quantity on output as well as output interacted 
by a contract dummy.  The contract dummy is one for a contract farmer and zero 
otherwise.  The coefficient on the interaction variable estimates the difference in feed-
conversion ratios between the two groups of producers.  The results are presented in 
Table 8.  Once again the standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity as well as 
correlations between errors stemming from producer specific components.  It is clear that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
lower than what independent operators source from breeders.   However, our data does not allow us to 
adjust for transfer pricing in the cost of chicks.   
  12 the difference between the feed-conversion ratios for contract and noncontract production 
is statistically significant. 
 
6.  Do Contract Growers Earn More than Noncontract Growers? 
In the earlier section, we analyzed the relative efficiency of the contract 
production system taking into account the costs to both growers and processors.  Here we 
consider contracting from the point of view of growers alone.  Do contract growers earn 
more than noncontract growers?  To answer this question, we calculate for contract and 
noncontract growers their average income per kg of output from a production cycle.   
This is the difference between revenues and input costs.  Revenues are from the sale of 
grown chicks, litter and bags. The value of home consumption, if any, is also imputed to 
revenues.  Inputs consist of chicks, feed, medicine, vaccine, litter, veterinary fees, labor, 
electricity and disinfectants.  For contact growers, however, the processor advances most 
of the value of inputs.  Compared to the noncontract grower, the contract grower needs 
less working capital and therefore incurs lower interest costs.  Information on the 
opportunity cost of funds for contract and noncontract farmers is, however, missing in the 
survey.   
  From studies of rural finance, we know that informal credit is widely prevalent 
and that it is more costly than credit from institutional sources.  According to the all India 
rural credit survey, formal sector accounted for 53% of all rural credit in 1991.  
Moneylenders and friends or relatives account for the rest.  More recent data from the 
World Bank indicates that access to formal sector credit is very limited for poorer 
households.  According to the same survey, the median interest from banks (the primary 
  13 institutional source) in 2003 was 12.5% per annum while the average interest rate from 
informal sources was 48%.  For credit from institutional sources, transactions costs are 
also significant.  These arise because of distance to financial institutions, cumbersome 
procedures and bribes ranging from 10% to 20% of loan amount (Srivastava and Basu, 
2004).  As a result, the effective cost of credit from formal sources is likely to be greater 
than the median interest rate.  A survey in 2001 of the poultry sector reports that interest 
rates on commercial loans were typically around 15% per annum (USDA, 2004).  As 
informal credit is more costly than this, an interest cost of 15% per annum can be taken to 
be a lower bound to the cost of credit for growers.   
Table 8 compares the incomes from poultry farming for interest rates ranging 
from 15% to 30% per annum.  As one would expect, the returns to noncontract growers 
declines significantly as interest rates rise while the contract farmers are almost 
completely insulated from credit costs.  The returns are equal for both modes of 
production at a 10% rate of interest.  For interest rates higher than 10%, the returns for 
contract growers are higher than that of contract growers.  If we take 15% to be a 
representative borrowing rate for growers, contract farmers earn on average Rs. 0.15 per 
kg more than noncontract farmers, i.e., about 7% more than the per kg average earnings 
of a noncontract grower.  We saw in the last section that contract production generates a 
minimum surplus of Rs. 1.9 per kg relative to noncontract production.  If, in fact, 15% is 
the also cost of funds for processors, then contract production yields a surplus of Rs 2.07 
per kg out of which farmers receive Rs 0.15 or about 7% of surplus.  Note that the entire 
remainder is not the profit of processor as the processor also incurs costs in administering 
and managing contracts that are not taken into account here.   
  14 While the gains to contract farmer are not trivial in magnitude, they are not 
statistically significant when interest costs are 15% per annum (see last column of Table 
8).  The standard errors of the difference in returns between contract and noncontract 
growers are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation (a cluster here 
consists of production cycles from a particular producer).  As the relative advantage of 
contract farmers increases with interest cost, the statistical significance of the difference 
also increases.   
 
7.  Correcting for Self-Selection 
In the last section, we compared the average returns of contract farmers with the 
average returns of non-contract farmers.  While this is useful to demonstrate the 
distribution of surplus from contracting, it is a biased measure of the gains that actually 
accrues to contract farmers because it does not take account of the fact that the processor 
purposively selects the contract farmers.  Hence it is likely that the population of contract 
farmers differ from the population of non-contract farmers.   
To take this into account, we adopt the treatment effects models from the program 
evaluation literature.  Let   be the returns with contracting and  the returns without 
contracting for the ith producer.  Clearly, only one outcome is observed for each 
producer.  The average treatment effect is  while the treatment effect on the 
treated is  .  Comparing mean outcomes of contract and noncontract 
farmers is equivalent to   which is in general not equal to 
either the average treatment effect or the treatment effect on the treated.   
1 i y
= i
( 1 i y
0 i y
) ( 0 1 i i y y E −
) 0 | ( 0 = i i C y
) 1 | ) (( 0 1 − i i C y y E
| E ) 1 − = i E C
In a regression framework, the treatment effects model is given by  
  15  (1)     i i i i bC a R ε + + + = X c' 
where is the net returns of the ith producer,   is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if farmer i is in contracting and takes the value 0 otherwise.  X
i R i C
i is a vector of control 
variables such as farmer characteristics (experience, and ’s are zero mean random 
variables.  b measures the impact of contracting on mean returns.  Under the assumption 
of homogenous treatment effects, b identifies the average treatment effect as well as the 
treatment effect on the treated (Wooldridge, 2002).   
ε
  If the variables in the X matrix include all the variables that influence whether a 
producer is a contract grower and if these variables are not correlated with the error term, 
then ordinary least squares estimates of (1) are consistent.  These are displayed in the 
second column of Table 9 (assuming an interest rate of 15%).  The estimate of the impact 
of contracting is comparable to the difference in group means (in Table 8) and is 
insignificant.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within cluster 
correlation.  The other variables have the expected signs and are significant.  The other 
variables in the regression are experience, experience squared, season, season squared 
and value of assets.  Season is a variable that takes values from 1 to 12 and identifies the 
month in which production begins.  Thus a production cycle with a season code of 1 
begins production in early January and the output enters the market after mid-February.  
The season variable is therefore meant to take account of the seasonality in prices and 
production.  As the seasonal trend is quadratic, we have also included the squared term of 
season.  
If treatment impacts are heterogenous, then additional controls in the form of 
interactions of the contract dummy with the demeaned explanatory variables must be 
  16 included (Wooldridge, 2002).  These estimates are contained in the third column of Table 
9.  Note that under heterogenous effects, the average treatment effect and the treatment 
effect on the treatment no longer coincide and the coefficient on the contract dummy 
identifies the average treatment effect.  The magnitude and significance of the average 
treatment effect improves but it is still not significant even at the 10% level.   
We also ran these regressions assuming interest costs to growers are 20%, 25% 
and 30%.   In Table 10, we report the summary in terms of the magnitude and 
significance of the contracting dummy.  As one would expect, the average treatment 
effect is greater and statistically more significant, higher is the interest rate.   
An ordinary least squares estimate of (1) is likely to be biased, however, if     
contains within it random unobservable factors, such as ability, which are not uniformly 
distributed within the population of contracting and noncontracting farmers.  In such a 
case error term is likely to be correlated with C
i ε
i.  Thus, for instance, if contract growers 
are more productive than noncontract growers because of unobserved ability, then a 
simple comparison of the means as well the OLS estimates of (1) would yield an 
overestimate of the true measure of gains from contracting.   
  Standard instrument variable procedures are used to correct for the bias from the 
endogeneity of right hand side variables.  Consider a participation equation such as  
(2)     i i i u Z C + + = 2 1 γ γ
where Zi is a vector of variables that matter for participation.  Variables in Zi will overlap 
with variables in Xi.  Identification requires that there be at least one variable in Zi that is 
not in Xi (Wooldridge, 2002)   If this condition is met, the predicted value from (2), 
can be used as an instrument for C
^
i C i in regression equation (1).  This would yield a  
  17 consistent estimate of b provided the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in 
equation (1) 
  Table 11 displays the estimates from a participation equation.  Growers who are at 
more distance from credit facilities, less specialized in poultry and with previous 
occupational backgrounds in nonagriculture are more likely to be contract growers.  In 
addition, experience and schooling negatively affect the probability of being a contract 
grower.  These results are consistent with anecdotal accounts in poultry of processors 
wishing to contract with growers with weak bargaining power.  Such an outcome was 
discussed by Key and Runsten (1999).  In their review of contract farming, they pointed 
out that the factors that disadvantage small farmers (such as lack of access to formal 
credit and insurance) also provide incentives for processors to contract with them.   
Of the variables in the participation equation, distance from rural banks is the 
variable that seems to best fit the specifications of an instrument.  It has predictive power 
in the participation equation and, conditional on the contract dummy, it is also redundant 
in the income equation.  The variables of schooling, specialization in poultry and 
previous occupational background, could affect income in addition to their effect through 
participation.  As it turns out, however, they are insignificant in the income equation 
possibly because their impact on the outcome works through grower’s experience in 
poultry that is independently controlled for.  Hence, these variables are also good 
instruments.   
Table 12 contains estimates of equation (1) where the dummy for participation in 
contracting is instrumented by the predicted probabilities from the participation equation. 
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation.  The 
  18 other variables in the regression are experience, experience squared, season and season 
squared. The dependent variable in this regression is computed assuming the cost of 
credit to be 15% per annum.  The second column in Table 12 is the IV counterpart to the 
OLS results in the second column in Table 9 assuming homogenous treatment effects 
while the third column in Table 13 is the IV counterpart to the OLS results in the third 
column in Table 9 and assumes heterogenous treatment effects.   
  The instrument variable estimates of the average treatment effect are larger and 
statistically more significant than the OLS estimates.  The IV estimate from the 
homogenous effects model is significant at the 10% level and that from the heterogenous 
effects model is significant at the 1.4% level.  Comparison with the OLS estimates  
suggests that correction for unobservables is important.  The OLS estimates 
underestimate the gain from contracting because the unobserved factors that matter for 
selection as contract grower negatively impact incomes from poultry farming.   While the 
OLS suggest modest impacts of between Rs. 0.15 – Rs. 0.2, the IV estimates are 
substantial ranging from Rs. 0.6 to Rs. 0.75 per kg.  Considering average noncontract and 
contract returns are Rs 2.07 and Rs. 2.2 respectively, contracting raises returns by at least 
25%.  For higher interest rates, the impacts are even larger and highly significant.  Once 
again, the results for these scenarios are presented only in summary form in Table 14.   
 
8.  Risk Shifting from Contracting 
  Calculating the mean income gains from contracting provides only a partial 
picture of the change in utility for contracting producers.  As mentioned before, a 
fundamental feature of contract farming is the shifting of risk from producers to 
  19 processors.  In the broiler contract, much of the price risk is reduced by the use of the 
bro-mark (set by the processors) rather than the market price.  
The most straightforward way to estimate risk shifting would be to compare the 
variability of net returns of contract growers with that of non-contract growers.  But this 
comparison would once again be subject to bias because of the use of incorrect counter-
factual.  Knoeber and Thurman (1995) propose that the variability of net returns of 
contract growers be compared to the hypothetical or simulated returns that they would 
have received as “independent growers” i.e., if they had purchased inputs and sold their 
output at market prices and not contracted with the integrator.   
 Let  i σ  denote the standard deviation for the ith producer.  These are calculated 
from the data on 6 production cycles for each grower.  Also let ( ,  ) and (v c σ n σ c, vn) 
denote mean standard deviation and mean coefficient of variation for the group of 
contract growers and noncontract growers respectively.  They are estimated as the sample 
means of the  ’s and v i σ i’s and are reported in the first two rows (and second and third 
columns) of Table 15.  The computations assume the lowest possible interest rate of 15% 
per annum.  The table also reports the standard errors of these estimates.  The figures 
show that the variability of returns of noncontract growers exceed that of contract 
growers by a factor of 8 or 10 depending on the measure of variability (standard 
deviation or coefficient of variation).  However the estimate of average variability for the 
noncontract growers is not very precise because of the large differences in variability 
within the noncontract group.  The coefficient of variation ranges between 0.23 and 4.3 
for noncontract growers while it ranges between 0.023 and 0.26 for contract growers.   
  20   Following the Knoeber and Thurman methodology, we simulate the returns that 
would have been received by contract growers if they had not been on contract.  There 
are two components of the simulation.  First, for the inputs advanced by the processor 
(chicks, feed, medicine and vaccines), we value their cost using prices paid by 
noncontract farmers.  Second, we use the price received by noncontract growers for their 
birds, bags and litter to value the output of these items by contract growers.  As the prices 
received (for output) and prices paid (for inputs) by noncontract growers are not 
identically the same, we use the median figure in all the cases.  In all imputations, we use 
figures from comparable production cycles.  For instance, the price used to value a 
contract grower’s output from production starting in January would be the median price 
of noncontract growers in the same month.   
  From the simulated series, we construct once again the mean and standard 
deviation of returns.  Let si denote the standard deviation of the simulated series for the 
ith producer.  Also let sc denote the mean standard deviation for the group of contract 
growers.  This is reported in the last column of Table 15.  The variability of the simulated 
series is of the same order of magnitude as the variability of returns for noncontract 
growers.  On average, the standard deviation of the simulated series is more than 8 times 
greater than that of the actual series.   
For each individual grower we compute the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
simulated series to the standard deviation of the observed series.  For the 25 contract 
growers, the average of this ratio is 13.4.  The median ratio is 8.25 and the distribution 
ranges from a minimum value of 2.7 to a maximum value of 91.  At the median level, 
growers under contracting bear only 12% of the risk that would have been borne by them 
  21 as noncontract farmers.  In other words, 88% of the risk in poultry farming is shifted from 
farmers to processors as a result of contracting.  
The statistical significance of the reduction in variability can be assessed for each 
grower by testing the hypothesis that the simulated variance for the ith contract grower 
equals the variance of the observed series.  As the simulated and observed series are 
correlated, Knoeber and Thurman derive a Wald statistic that takes this correlation into 
account.  The statistic is  
2 / 1 2 4 4 2 2 )] 2 )( / 2 /[( ) ( i i i i i i s n s T ρ σ σ − + − =  
where for the ith producer, and  are the sample variances of the simulated and actual 
series,   is the covariance between the two series and n is the number of production 
cycles.  Under the null hypothesis that the variances of the two series are identical, the 







  The median value of the Wald ratio is 1.69, which means that for 50% of contract 
growers the null of no difference in variability is rejected in favor of the one-sided 
alternative that the variability is greater in the simulated series at the 5% significance 
level.  The smallest Wald ratios is 1.41.  Hence the null would be rejected in favor of the 
alternative for all growers at the 10% significant level.  The reason that the differences 
are not statistically valid at the 5% level for some growers is because of the very small 
number of production cycles as a result of which the differences in variability are 
estimated imprecisely.   
The risk reduction from contracting can also be assessed by testing the null 
hypothesis that the median value of   and s i σ i are equal.  This can be done by making use 
of nonparametric tests for difference in medians using paired data.  The paired data in this 
  22 instance involves the observed and simulated standard deviations for each grower.  The 
sign test considers the number of times the difference between the simulated and 
observed standard deviations is positive.  The null is rejected if the number of differences 
of one sign is too large or too small (Gibbons and Chakraborti, 1992).  In our case, the 
difference between the simulated and observed standard deviations is positive for each 
grower.  Hence the null is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the median 
difference is positive.   
If the distributions can be regarded as symmetric, one can also use the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test.  Here the absolute differences between the paired values is ranked and 
the test statistic is the sum of the positive signed ranks that is then compared to the 
tabulated critical values (Gibbons and Chakraborti, 1992).  Here too the null is 
resoundingly rejected in favor of the alternative of positive differences at the 0% 
significance level.   
 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
The literature on contract farming has emphasized the role of insurance and credit 
in explaining the existence and success of contract farming arrangements.  This is 
undoubtedly the case in the instance of poultry farming as well.  In terms of value, the 
processor advances the bulk of the inputs.  Thus, we find that the gains to contract 
growers (relative to noncontract growers) is higher, greater is the cost of funds.  We also 
find that contracting shifts a large portion of market risk from the grower to the 
processor.  
  23 In addition to these aspects, the poultry case considered here highlights the 
efficiency factor that has not received much attention in the contract farming literature.  
We find that contract production is more efficient than production by independent 
growers.  As a result, by contracting, processors generate an efficiency surplus that is 
almost entirely appropriated by them.  However, and despite this, contract growers do 
gain substantially even in terms of expected income even though their returns are not 
much different from what is received by independent growers (unless interest rates are 
greater than 20%).        
The key to this puzzle is that poultry processors choose as contract growers those 
whose skills, experience and access to credit make them relatively poor prospects as 
independent growers.  With contract production, these growers achieve incomes 
comparable to that of independent growers.  As a result, the processor is able to capture 
most of the surplus from contract production (relative to procurement from independent 
growers) while offering at the same time significant gains to contract growers in terms of 
a reduction in risk as well as higher expected returns.   
Crucial to this outcome are the improved technology and management practices 
that are employed in contract production.  This results in lower feed-conversion ratio and  
is achieved by producers whose endowments are not as suited to poultry production as 
the independent growers.  This is possibly due to standardization of production practices 
in contract production as contract growers exhibit a striking homogeneity in feed-
conversion ratios and expected returns relative to independent growers.  As this is 
achieved by close supervision on the part of the processor, contract farming in poultry 
  24 can be seen as a response to double-sided moral hazard, which was put forward, by 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) to explain sharecropping.   
The fact that contract production in poultry has benefited growers substantially 
suggests that these growers are not bereft of bargaining power.  But what is the source of 
this bargaining strength?  Why does not the processor offer growers a contract that is 
only slightly better than their reservation utility in their alternative enterprise (say as 
subsistence growers)?  Poultry contracting involves the use of improved and standardised 
technology and production practices.  This involves supply of inputs, close contact and 
training of the contract grower.  Protecting this investment (in inputs and training) 
requires that default by growers and turnover in their ranks should be minimum.  This in 
turn is achieved by processors offering above reservation utility contracts akin to 
efficiency wages.  In its absence, the threat of denial of future contracts is not a major 
deterrent to default and defection by contract growers.
9     
 The poultry case study suggests that contract farming is a useful institutional 
arrangement for the supply of credit, insurance and technology to farmers – all of which 
are otherwise very demanding problems.  For many commodities, however, contract 
farming in India is not legal because of the agricultural produce marketing acts which 
make it mandatory for commodities under the act to be wholesaled in regulated markets.  
Removing these prohibitions would be important to widen the scope of contract farming.  
Some observers believe that contract farming should be regulated to ensure that 
processors live up to the promises made in the contract regarding the quality of inputs, 
                                                            
9 Such threats are the primary means by which processors enforce contracts (Key and Runsten, 1999).  A 
leading processor in India commented “Our rule is very clear – we will never work with you once you 
violate our contract” (interview with Executive Director, Pepsico Holdings Pvt. Ltd, Agriculture Today, 
September 2004).   
  25 provision of credit and the buy-back arrangements.  Note, however, that this is not an 
issue in the poultry example where the processor supplies 97% of the value of inputs.  As 
a result, the interests of the processor and the grower are closely aligned.   
  26  
 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ cost Fitted values
 
 
  28 Table 1.  Access to Infrastructure 
Item Noncontract  Contract 
Distance to urban area  28.36  17.16 
Distance to coop credit society  0.43  2.48 
Distance to regional rural bank  1.2  6.84 
Distance to primary dairy cooperative society  0.48  8.5 
Distance to vet. Hospital  .8  0.71 
 
 
Table 2.  Characteristics of Poultry Producers 
Item Noncontract  Contract 
Experience in poultry  9.8  4.9 
Age 36  39 
Years of schooling  11.6  10.9 
Proportion of farmers whose main 
occupation is poultry 
72 36 
Proportion of farmers whose subsidiary 
occupation is poultry 
28 64 
Proportion of farmers whose earlier 
occupation was in agriculture/poultry/ 
dairy/ agricultural labour/ agriculture-
related business 
75 58 
Proportion of farmers whose earlier 





  29 Table 3.  Input Use by Poultry Producers 
Averages Per Production Cycle 
 
Item Noncontract  Contract 
Time: Cycle length (days)  48.4  42.6 
Litter, quantity (quintals)  13.2  17.8 
Litter , value (Rs.)  991  1,375 
No of chicks  6,891  8,149 
Chicks, value (Rs. )  70,217  96,558 
Feed qty (quintals)  276  277 
Medicine + Feed, Value 
(Rs.) 
244,615 307,246 
Vaccinations per cycle  2.53  3 
Vaccination, cost  6,174  8,148 
Veterenian fees (Rs.)  268  566 
Labour cost (Rs.)  5,076  6,152 
Family labour (male) (Days)  26  23 
Family Labour (female) 
(Days) 
4 3.2 
Hired labour (male) (Days)  76  104 
Hired labour (female) 
(Days) 
37 33 
Electricity, value (Rs.)  2,930  2,925 
Bulbs, (Rs.)  335  274 
Disinfectants (Rs.)  861  993 
Total shed area (square feet) 
per grower 
9501 6335 
No. of Brooders per grower  12  24 
No. of Feeders per grower  158  175 
No. of borewells per grower  0.36  0.6 






  30 Table 4.  Output and Revenues: Averages Per Production Cycle 
 
 Noncontract  Contract 
Output: # of birds  6583  7808 
Mortality: # of birds  302   388  
Average total weight of birds 
sold (Kgs) 
12105 13638 
Average Weight per bird, 
Kgs 
1.87 1.87 
Revenues from bird sales 
(Rs.) 
355,732 37,217 





Table 5:  Input Sharing: Averages per Production Cycle 
 
Value of all inputs (Rs. )  331,468  424,200 
Value of inputs supplied by 





Table 6:  Cost structure of Poultry Production 
Averages per Production Cycle 
 
 NonContract  Contract 
Chicks, value (Rs.)  70,217 (20%)  96,558 (22.5%) 
Feed & Medicines 
(including vaccinations and 
veterinarian fees) 
251,058 (77%)  315,959 (74.5%) 
Labor, electricity & other 
inputs 
9,203 (3%)  10,344 (3%) 
Total  331,468 424,200 
 
 
  31 Table 7:  Cost function of Poultry Producers 
 
Dependent Variable:  Variable cost per production cycle 
Variable Non-Contract  Contract 
Constant  6635 (2.17)  -11192  (-1.45) 
Output (kgs)  26.28 (110)  30 (36) 
2 R   0.983 0.98 
# Observations  145  140 
    t-statistics in parantheses 
 
Table 8:  Feed-Conversion Ratios  
 
Dependent Variable:  Feed Quantity 
Constant 7.98  (1.8) 





2 R   0.983 
# Observations  145 
     t-statistics in parantheses 
 
Table 9.  Returns to Poultry Producers: 




Contract Noncontract  Difference  (t-
value) 
15% 2.20  2.05  0.15  (0.76) 
20% 2.20  1.9  0.3  (1.49) 
25% 2.19  1.66  0.44  (2.2) 
30% 2.18  1.47  0.58  (2.84) 
  32 Table 10.  Income Equation:  Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependent Variable:  Income (Rupees) per kg per production cycle 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficients (t-values):  
Homogenous Treatment 
Effects 
Coefficients (t-values):  
Heterogenous Treatment 
Effects 
Contract Dummy:  C  0.16 (0.97)  0.21 (1.39) 
Season: X1  -0.66 (4.98)  -1.23 (5.18) 
Season squared: X2  0.055 (5.27)  0.09 (5.72) 
Experience: X3  0.19 (3.77)  0.29 (3.15) 
Experience squared:  X4  -0.01 (3.93)  -0.017 (3.52) 
) ( * 1 1 X X C −   --- 1.16  (4.87) 
) ( * 2 2 X X C −   --- -0.09  (5.33) 
) ( * 3 3 X X C −   --- -0.25  (2.33) 
) ( * 4 4 X X C −   --- .015  (2.39) 
Constant  2.98 (8.83)  3.84 (2.39) 
2 R   15 . 0  0.23 
No of Observations     
 
Table 11:  OLS estimates of Treatment Effects Under Varying Interest Rates 
Interest Rate  Average Treatment Effect (t-
value): Homogenous Effects 
Average Treatment Effect (t-
value): Heterogenous Effects 
15%  0.16 (0.97)  0.21 (1.39) 
20%  0.3 (1.85)  0.35 (2.36) 
25%  0.44 (2.69)  0.49 (3.28) 
30%  0.58 (3.47)  0.63 (4.16) 
 
  33 Table 12:  Probit Equation: Factors Influencing Participation in Contracting 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficients (t-values)  Marginal Effects 
Distance from Regional Rural Bank  0.17 (6.62)  .07 
Years of Schooling  -0.06 (-2.2)  -0.02 
Experience -0.54  (5.94)  -0.21 
Experience squared  0.02 (4.52)  0.009 
Whether previous in Non-Agriculture  0.74 (3.17)  0.29 
Whether Poultry is main occupation  -0.84 (-4.01)  -0.32 
Constant 2.45  (5.6)  -- 
No. of Observations  50  50 
 
Table 13:  Income Equation:  Instrument Variables 
Dependent Variable:  Income (Rupees) per kg per production cycle 
Explanatory Variables  Coefficients (t-values):  
Homogenous Treatment 
Effects 
Coefficients (t-values):  
Heterogenous Treatment 
Effects 
Contract Dummy:  C  0.61 (1.69)  0.74 (2.54) 
Season: X1  -0.66 (4.99)  -1.05 (4.07) 
Season squared: X2  0.055 (5.32)  0.08 (4.4) 
Experience: X3  0.22 (3.37)  0.33 (2.54) 
Experience squared:  X4  -0.01 (3.68)  -0.017 (3.04) 
) ( * 1 1 X X C −   --- 0.78  (2.37) 
) ( * 2 2 X X C −   --- -0.06  (2.33) 
) ( * 3 3 X X C −   --- -0.24  (1.14) 
) ( * 4 4 X X C −   --- .014  (0.93) 
Constant  2.47 (4.97)  2.96 (1.07) 
No. of Observations  285  285 
  34 Table 14:  IV estimates of Treatment Effects Under Varying Interest Rates 
Interest Rate  Average Treatment Effect (t-
value): Homogenous Effects 
Average Treatment Effect (t-
value): Heterogenous Effects 
15%  0.61 (1.69)  0.74 (2.54) 
20%  0.76 (2.11)  0.9 (3.05) 
25%  0.92 (2.50)  1.05 (3.53) 
30%  1.06 (2.87)  1.19 (3.97) 
 
Table 15:  Variability of Returns  




Mean of Standard Deviations of 
Individual Growers (standard 
error) 
29 . 2 = n σ  
(0.84) 
= c σ 0.26 
(0.16) 
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